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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent,: 
-vs-
DENNIS BOYD GARDNER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 15536 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with three counts of distribu-
tion of controlled substance for value in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §58-37-8 (1) (a) (ii) (1953). 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty 
of three counts of distribution of controlled substances for 
value (two counts for phentermine, one count for marijuana), 
on September 8, and 9, 1977, in the District Court in and 
for Carbon County, Utah, the Honorable Edward Sheya presiding. 
On November 9, 1977, appellant was sentenced for each of the 
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three counts; to 1) three years probation, 2) 90 days in 
jail and 3) ordered to repay the county for attorney fees 
that had been encurred in his defense. The three sentences 
were to be served concurrently with only one restitution of 
attorney fees being required (R.73). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the verdict and 
judgment of the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Mr. Barry Becker was working as a Reg ion 8 Narcot: 
Task Force undercover agent during December of 1976 (T .14). 
In that capacity, he met appellant in the Point After Bar 
in Helper, Utah, on December 1, 1976 (T.l6). Appellant offE 
to sell Mr. Becker some "cartwheels," the street name for 
amphetamines (T.l6). After some negotiations, Mr. Becker q 
appellant twenty-five dollars in exchange for a bag of twen· 
amphetamines (T .17) . A similar incident occurred the follo; 
ing night. Becker met appellant elsewhere and then they dr 
to the Point After Bar where Hr. Becker again exchanged t1>e 
dollars for a bag of pills represented to be twenty 
amphetamines (T.21-22). 
On December 7, 19 7 6, Hr. Becker was in the No Na: 
Bar when appellant offered to sell him a "lid" of marijuan' 
(T.24-25). In exchange for ten dollars, Mr. Becker recei 
a baggie from appellant, proportedly containing marijuana 
-2-
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Bruce Beck, toxicologist for the Utah State 
Department of Health (T.52) testified that his findings 
indicated that the first two exhibits presented by the 
State were Phentermine, a substance similar in effect to 
amphetamines (T.53-54). Mr. Beck also verified that the 
State's third exhibit was marijuana (T.SS). 
ARGUHENT 
POINT I 
THE LO>vER COURT PROPERLY RESTRICTED CROSS EXAMINA-
TION OF A STATE'S WITNESS CONCERNING A PRIOR CHARGE OF FALSE 
STATEMENT AND ITS ATTENDANT JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS. 
Prior to the presentation of any evidence-the-tr:-:~i..:a:t-,llo---­
court held a hearing regarding a motion in limini. The Court 
ascertained that Mr. Barry Becker, the State's chief witness, 
had previously been charged with a misdemeanor crime involving 
moral turpitude in California (T.9). Evidence presented by 
the State showed that Mr. Barry Becker had fulfilled his 
probation and the court, pursuant to statute, allowed him 
to withdraw his guilty plea, enter a plea of not guilty, dis-
missed the Information involved and released him from "all 
penalty and disability therefrom" (T.6). 
After full discussion of this matter the court 
determined that it would be improper to allow appellant to 
cross-examine Mr. Becker concerning these previous judicial 
proceedings and directed her not to do so (T.l3). 
-3-
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Appellant argues that questioning about addition, 
details of this charge should have been allowed to impeach 
Mr. Becker's testimony by demonstrating he \vas a dishonest 
person. Respondent submits that this argument is not 
supported by the facts of the case nor the current state 
of the law. 
Appellant focuses on Rule 21 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence in support of his argument. Rule 21 reads: 
"Evidence of the conviction of 
a witness for a crime not involving 
dishonesty or false statement shall 
be inadmissible for the purpose of 
impairing his credibility, except 
as otherwise provided by statute." 
Even assuming, arguendo, that appellant is correct in his 
assertion that this rule would allow evidence of a 
misdemeanor conviction involving dishonesty or false state· 
ment to be presented for impeachment pur.poses,1 J:esponder 
submits that this rule would not be applicable in the 
present case. Respondent asserts that the proceedings 
against Mr. Becker in California did not consti tut:e a con-
viction for purposes of this Rule. 
1 Respondent has found no judicial interpretation as to 
the scope of this rule. Whether the rule applies onlY 
to evidence of felony conviction or whether misdemeano: 
evidence is also included within the rule seems to be 
an unsettled question. 
-4-
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The statute under which Mr. Becker's charge was 
dismissed is Ann. California Code, Section 1203.4 (Supp. 
1978). It reads in relevant part: 
"(a) In any cases in which a 
defendant has fulfilled the condi-
tions of probation for the entire 
period of probation, or has been 
discharged prior to the termination 
of the period of probation. • • the 
defendant shall, at any time after 
the termination of the period of 
probation, if he is not then serving 
a sentence for any offense, on 
probation for any offense, or charged 
with the commission of any offense, 
be permitted by the court to withdra'I'T 
his plea of guilty ••• and enter a 
plea of not guilty; ••• and, ••• 
the court shall thereupon dismiss the 
accusations or information against the 
defendant and he shall thereafter be 
released from all penalties and dis-
abilities resulting from the offense 
of which he has been convicted •••• " 
The California District Appeals Court determined 
the effect that the forerunner of this statute would have on 
the admissibility of impeaching evidence in the case of 
People v. Mackey, 58 Cal.App. 123, 208 Pac. 135 (Calif. 1922). 
In that case a principal witness against the defendant had 
been charged with a felony and had pled guilty. Under a 
procedure identical to that expressed in Section 1203.4, 
the court had dismissed the charge prior to the time he 
was testifying as a witness. The defendant sought to 
introduce the record of this prior conviction for impeachment 
-5-
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purposes, as was provided for by statute. But: the trial 
court sustained an objection to the offer of this 
evidence. In upholding the trial court, the Appeals 
Court discussed the purpose and legislative intent of 
the statute in question: 
"Of course, after a dismissal 
in such a situation, the defendant 
involved, if not still a convicted 
felon, remains in a practical sense 
one who has been convicted of a 
felony. We cannot avoid the 
conclusion, however, that the Legis-
lature intended in a legal sense by 
directing a dismissal under such 
circumstances, to wipe out absolutely 
the entire proceeding in question 
in a given case, and to place the 
defendant in the position which 
he would have occupied in all respects 
as a citizen if no accusation or 
information had ever been presented 
against him. Such is the legal effect 
of the dismissal of a criminal charge 
before conviction, and we are convinced 
that the lawmaking body intended, by 
section 1203, that the same effect 
should attend a dismissal after convic-
tion ••• On the whole, we conclude that 
the Legislature intended by the enact-
ment of section 1203 that no convicted 
person discharged after probation 
thenceforth should be regarded as one 
possessed of the degree of turpitude 
likely to affect his credibility as 
a witness." Id. at 138. 
This holding in Mackey makes clear that the 
California courts would not have allowed any further 
evidence concerning Mr. Becker's dismissed conviction to 
be admitted had this case been before a court of that 
-6-
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state. The reasoning of the Califronia court in Mackey was 
valid and logical and therefore should be applied by Utah 
courts. The similar intent of the Utah legislature to free 
people of certain disabilities relating to prior convictions 
is expressed in Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-17.5 (Supp. 1977): 
"(1) (a) Any person who has been 
convicted of any crime within this state 
may petition the convicting court for 
a judicial pardon and for the expungement 
of his record in that court • • • 
(b) If the court finds that the peti~ 
tioner, for a period of five years in the 
case of a class A misdemeanor or felony, or 
for a period of one year in the caseof ________ __ 
other misdemeanors, since his release from 
incarceration or probation, has not been 
convicted of a felony or of a misdemeanor 
involving moral turpitude and that no 
proceeding involving such a crime is 
pending or being instituted against the 
petitioner and, further, finds that the 
rehabilitation of the petitioner has been 
attained to the satisfaction of the court, 
it shall enter an order that all records 
in the petitioner's case in the custody 
of that court or in the custody of any 
other court, agency or official be 
sealed. • • 
(c) Upon the entry of the order in 
those proceedings, the pet1tioner shall be 
deemed judicially pardoned and the petitioner 
may thereafter respond to any inquiries 
relating to convictions of crimes as though 
that conviction never occurred." (Emphasis 
The important rehabilitative purpose of the above 
statute outweighs any need for a technical application of 
Rule 21. Respondent submits this type of proceeding, which 
-7-
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ends with a plea of not guilty being entered and the 
charges being dismissed is noi- within the purview of 
"conviction" evidence which the legislature intends to 
be utilized for impeachment purposes. Rule 21 therefore 
is inapplicable in the prese~' case. 
Further, evidence of the prior criminal 
proceedings involving Mr. Becker would not be admissible 
under the more general Rules of Evidence relating to 
impeaching evidence. 
Rule 22 establishes specific limitations on 
the admissibility of evidence affecting credibility. 
It reads, in relevant part: 
"(c) [E]vidence of traits of 
(a witness') character other than 
truth, honesty and integrity or 
their opposites, shall be inadmissible; 
(d) evidence of specific instances of 
his conduct relevant only as tending to 
prove a trait of his character, shall be 
inadmissible." 
Although this rule impliedly permits evidence as 
to the truth, honesty and integrity (or their opposites) 
of a witness, such evidence cannot take the form of 
specific instances of conduct. Rules 46 and 47 reveal 
that evidence of a bad character trait must take the fom 
of opinion or evidence of reputation. The only evidence 
of specific conduct allowed under these rules is evidence 
of conviction of a crime; an exception which is inapplicar 
-8-
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in the present case. 
Since evidence concerning these prior judicial 
proceedings against Mr. Becker would have been inadmissible 
under the Rules of Evidence it was properly excluded by the 
trial court. 
This conclusion is also supported by pre-Rule 
case law. In State v. Hougensen, 91 Utah 351, 64 P.2d 229 
(1936), a case heavily relied on by appellant, this 
Court established several principles to help guide the 
"bench and bar." Principle number eight, which was 
omitted by appellant, is directly applicable in the 
present case: 
"Where the questions of the 
cross-examiner call for isolated or 
sporadic acts or conduct directly 
tending to degrade the witness, or 
show moral turpitude, whether they 
would tend to subject the witness 
to punishment for.a felony or not, 
but which could not be said to mark 
the witness as one of lmv or dissolute 
character and which do not present 
any reasonable basis for an assumption 
that the witness was not telling the 
truth in the case, objection on the 
ground of irrelevancy and incompetency 
should be sustained." Id. at 238. 
This principle enunciates the balancing approach 
that the court found necessary when dealing with evidence 
of specific conduct. The prior specific conduct which 
-9-
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apparently involved false statement was totally unrelated 
in time or place to the testimony which the witness 
presented in the present case. It could not lead to any 
assumptions about the present testimony and one prior act 
does not establish that Mr. Becker is of "low and dissolutr 
character." The trial court's sustaining of the State's 
objection to questioning of this specific act: complied 
with this principle of Hougensen. 
Lastly, prior case law establishes that the 
extent of any cross-examination as to specific acts for 
purpose of credibility is within the sound discrc~tion of 
the trial court. 
"As to other matters affecting 
the witness' morality or violations 
of law, the field of cross-examination 
is largely within the sound discretion 
of the trial court and \¥ill not be 
disturbed except in cases of clear 
abuse of that discretion. State v. 
Hougensen (cite omitted." State v. 
Mcintyre, 92 Utah 177, 66 P.2d 879, 888 
(1937). 
The trial court gave considerable time for the d: 
cussion of this point at trial and had previously studied 
briefs prepared by counsel (T.l2-13). His preclusion cif I' 
questioning of Mr. Becker as to the prior California pro~ 
was a rational omission of inadmissable evidence and shoul 
sustained as a proper application of the trial court's di~ 
-10-
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POINT II 
APPELLANT'S CLAIH OF ERROR DUE TO H1PROPER CLOS-
ING REMARKS IS NOT REVIEWABLE BY THIS COURT SINCE CLOSING 
REMARKS WERE NOT HADE PART OF THE PRESENT RECORD. 
Appellant moved for a mistrial based on allegations 
of improper closing remarks by the respondent. The trial 
court reviewed the question and determined that counsel for 
the State had not exceeded proper limits in his closing 
argument. (T.71-72). Except for this indirect reference 
to closing remarks the transcript is silent as to the content 
of these remarks. Respondent has been told by the recorder 
in this case that the verbal arguments were not recoraed-.-----
Only a note as to when they occurred is present in the tran-
script (T.70). 
This Court can only review matters of record before 
it. Brandley v. Lewis, 97 Utah 217, 92 P.2d 338 (1939). 
Therefore, any review of non-recorded closing arguments would 
be improper. 
POINT III 
RESPONDENT ADMITS THAT PHENTERJv!INE IS NOT A CON-
TROLLED SUBSTANCE AND APPELLANT'S CONVICTION ON TWO COUNTS 
INVOLVInG PHENTERMINE SHOULD BE VOID. 
Phentermine is one of many substances which was 
added to the legislative list of controlled substances by 
-11-
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the Attorney General under the power granted by Utah Code 
Ann. §58-37-3(2). However, s1nce this Court has recently 
determined this power was an unconstitutional deligation, in 
State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d 683 (Utah, 1977), respondent con-
cedes that the conviction of appellant for the two counts of 
distribution of phentermine for value was improper and should 
be reversed. 
It is important to note, however, that appellant wu 
also convicted of distribution of marijuana for value. This 
substance is listed in Utah Code Ann. §58-37-4, under Schedule 
I(iii) (J), on the original legislative list of controlled su~ 
I 
stances and is, therefore, uneffected by the ruling in Gallion~ 
Appellant's sentence for this conviction of 1) three year pro-
bation, 2) 90 days in jail and 3) restitution for attorney f~ 
should be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
Detailed information about previous judicial pro-
ceedings against a witness was not proper evidence for impea& 
ment purposes since the proceedings had ultimately conclud~ 
with a plea of not guilty being entered, the charges being 
dismissed and the witness being relieved of criminal "dis-
abilities." Such proceedings do not constitute a "conviction" 
within the purpose or meaning of Rule 21. Neither is such 
evidence admissible to demonstrate a bad character trait sucl 
-12-
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it is not reputation evidence. The trial court properly 
excluded any questioning in this regard. And, since there 
is no transcript of closing arguments any alleged error of 
the prosecutor in his closing statement is not reviev1able 
by this court. 
Respondent concedes that phentermine is not a 
controlled substance under the holding in Gallion and, there-
fore, respondent does not oppose reversal on counts I and II. 
However, for the above-mentioned reasons, respondent 
contends that the conviction involving marijuana was proper 
and, therefore, respectfully submits that the judgment and 
sentence of the lower court on Count III of the amended~~· ___ _ 
complaint be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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